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Abstract 
This study investigated the short-term impact of domestic acquisitions on the acquirer 
shareholders’ equity in the US market.  Average abnormal returns and cumulative average 
abnormal return were calculated to evaluate the acquirer’s return for a sample of 90 US 
domestic acquisitions based on US NASDAQ market during the period 2012-2014. The 
method of payment for the acquisitions, the size of the deal, and the industry relatedness 
were considered to assess the impact on the domestic acquirer shareholders’ equity. Event 
study methodology was applied to analyze the shareholders’ equity of US domestic 
acquirers in the short-term. The announcement date of the acquisition was considered as 
the event day and the impact of the acquirer return was observed for four event windows: 
pre-announcement, in - announcement, post-announcement, and the entire short term 
around the announcement. The results of the study revealed that domestic acquisition 
significantly increased the acquirer shareholders’ equity during the pre and in- 
announcement periods in the US market, but it brought the acquirer shareholders a negative 
return post acquisition announcement. The method of payment, deal size and industry 
relatedness had no significant impact on the acquirer shareholders’ equity. The paper must 
have abstract not exceeding 200 words. 
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1  Introduction  
An acquisition is considered to be a combination of two or more businesses where one firm 
dominates the other, managerially and financially (Arnold [1]). In recent years, the 
acquisition of another business has become a common economic phenomenon and an 
integral part of the modern economy.  The acquisition of another business can be 
motivated by many factors and has attracted the attention of both scholars and policy 
makers. The strategy of mergers and acquisitions is used to improve financial performance 
and /or improve managerial performance. For example, from the perspective of improving 
financial performance, if the acquirer takes over a major competitor, it can increase its 
market share and exercise greater power in setting prices to increase its revenue. In addition, 
the acquirer can integrate and streamline similar services to reduce operating costs and 
improve operational efficiency. Moreover, a profitable acquirer can buy a loss making 
target and use the target’s negative performance to its advantage to reduce tax liability 
(Mergers and Acquisitions Lawsuit Centre [2]).  From the perspective of improving 
managerial performance, if the current owners of the target company cannot find proper 
successors to succeed them, acquisition can be a good way of solving this problem. 
Sometimes, a target company has to give up its identity to survive a financial crisis (Mergers 
and Acquisitions Lawsuit Centre [2]). All of the above factors contribute to making an 
acquisition happen, with a resulting impact on a shareholder’s equity - a “successful” 
acquisition will result in greater market value for the shareholders.  However, even before 
the long term success of an acquisition can be determined, there will be perceptions as to 
its likely success which will have an immediate effect on market value.  The aim of the 
current study, therefore, is to investigate the short-term/immediate impact of domestic 
acquisitions on acquirer shareholders’ equity in the US market and whether this impact is 
influenced by certain conditions.  
 
 
2  Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1 Motives for Acquisition 
The primary objective of financial management is to maximize the market value of the firm 
for its owners, that is, the maximization of shareholders’ wealth (Manne [3], Cho [4], 
Peterson and Fabozzi [5], Cooper et al. [6], Dayananda et al. [7]).  With mergers and 
acquisitions, the shareholder wealth maximization criterion is satisfied from the acquirer’s 
standpoint when the added value through the acquisition of a target company exceeds the 
cost of acquisition i.e. the transaction costs and the acquisition premium (Manne [3]). Many 
researchers suggest that the acquirer shareholders’ equity increases around the time of the 
announcement of an acquisition (e.g., Datta et al. [9], Rani et al. [10], Rani et al. [11], 
Mandelker [12] Langeteig [13], Dodd and Ruback [14], Jarrell and Poulsen [15], Brunner 
[16], Mulherin and Boone [17]) in anticipation of future increase in wealth as a result of the 
acquisition. This is because one of the main motives for acquiring another business is to 
obtain synergy, which occurs when the value of the combined firms is greater than the sum 
of the acquirer and target as individual firms. Financial synergy can arise by realizing a 
lower cost of capital through organization portfolio diversification or by reducing 
systematic risk of the business (Holl and Kyriazis [18]). Operational synergy benefits may 
include cost reductions through the elimination or streamlining of processes, access to a 
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new market by avoiding trade barriers, or having more accessible resources and employing 
skilled workers (Arnold [1]).  Some authors have suggested that acquisition is always 
associated with a positive wealth effect for acquirers (e.g. Bradley et al. [19] and Dennis 
and McConnel [20]). 
Hankir et al. [21], however, have argued that, although theoretically synergy might be 
anticipated for value creation, the empirical evidence proposes that this might not always 
be the case due to capital markets not believing in synergy realization as a rationale for 
acquisition. Moreover, if the acquisition is motivated by the acquirer’s ‘top management’s’ 
hubris about the valuation of the acquisition resulting in a misjudgment on the premium 
that should be spent on acquiring the target business, this will result in destroying the 
acquirer shareholder’s wealth (Berkovitch and Narayanan [22]).  Shleifer and Vishney [23] 
also suggest  that managers may have their own self-interested motives in attempting an 
acquisition, for example, making investments that increase managerial value, such as 
welfare and prestige, at the expense of sacrificing the acquirer shareholders’ wealth. 
 
2.2 Other Considerations 
A number of empirical studies suggest that due to asymmetric information between insiders 
and outsiders, agency problems between the acquirer’s management and shareholders, and 
the high cost of bidding wars among potential acquirers, the acquirer might suffer an 
insignificant negative market return (Jensen and Ruback [24], Roll [25], Morck and Yeung 
[26], Subeniotis et al. [27]). Roll [25] pointed out that normally acquisition needs free cash 
flow to capitalize the transaction, although the risk to the organization is reduced through 
portfolio diversification, while on the other hand, this might generate negative NPV, which 
reflects on the acquirer’s share price.  Previous research findings have also suggested that 
the return to the acquiring shareholders depends on various characteristics (Datta et al. [9]). 
Additionally, according to Limmack [28], whether an acquisition increases the acquirer 
shareholders’ equity depends on the period included in the analysis and the control model 
used.  This study is concerned with the immediate period around the announcement date 
of an acquisition and the impact of payment method, industry relatedness and transaction 
size on the market value of the acquirer’s shareholder wealth. 
 
2.3 Effect on Acquirer’s Shareholder Equity of Firm and Transaction 
Characteristics 
2.3.1 Method of payment  
In a market acquisition, the acquirer can pay for the acquisition either using cash only or 
by paying with a combination of cash and own stock. Most empirical studies agree that the 
payment mode plays an important role in determining the acquiring firm’s stock return (e.g. 
Asquith et al. [29], Datta et al. [9], Huang and Walkling [30], Travlos [31], Fuller et al. [32], 
Yook [33], Heron and Lie [34]). Rani et al. [10] found that domestic acquisition financed 
by a combination of cash and stock generates negative returns for the acquirer’s 
shareholders around the acquisition announcement, whereas domestic acquisition financed 
by cash generates a zero or a slightly positive return for the acquirer’s shareholders. Jensen 
and Ruback [24] and Myer and Majluf [35] have stated that an acquisition paid by cash 
reduces the agency cost because the bidding firm does not need to request Securities and 
Exchange Commission for approval and it conveys a positive signal to the market.   In 
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contrast, if the acquisition is paid by stock, it conveys a negative signal to the market that 
the acquirer is not confident about the valuation of the target company. However, Franks et 
al. [36] argued that a cash transaction might impose an immediate tax liability on the target 
shareholders, which might cause the target firm to seek compensation in the form of a 
higher premium, making an acquisition paid by cash more costly than if paid by stock. 
Rappaport and Sirower [37] and Martin [38] also proposed that firms with excellent futures 
should not pay in cash for acquisitions. There is an argument that it is beneficial to pay in 
stock, especially in the case of high-risk transactions, because the target business will have 
more incentive to make the takeover a success.  Therefore, it can be seen in the literature 
there are arguments both for and against both forms of payment for acquisition and further 
research may clarify whether this has an impact on immediate shareholder wealth. 
 
2.3.2 Industry relatedness  
Some of the literature has focused attention on industry relatedness i.e. whether the acquired 
business is trading within the same industry as the acquirer, and whether this might impact 
on acquirer shareholders’ equity. According to Campa and Hernanado [39], Jensen and 
Ruback [24], Bradley et al. [40] and Walker [41], industry related acquisition tends to bring 
more cumulative average abnormal returns than unrelated industry acquisition. This 
research result was also testified by Sudarsanam et al. [42], Harris and Ravensraft [43] and 
King et al. [44], who state that operational synergy gains in an industry-related acquisition 
such as corporate control efficiency and economy of scale can drive and realize higher 
abnormal returns than in an acquisition of a business in an unrelated industry. Moreover, 
Comment and Jarrell [45], and Lang and Stulz [46] have both found a negative relation 
between unrelated diversification and acquirer shareholders’ abnormal return. In other 
words, unrelated diversification through cross-industry acquisition may not produce wealth 
and may even cause greater agency costs and operating inefficiencies, which will have a 
negative impact on the performance of the acquirer and destroy the acquirer shareholders’ 
wealth.  
However, Delong [47] totally contradicts this result, stating that an industry-unrelated 
acquisition can create positive abnormal returns for the acquirer’s shareholders, because it 
can still offer administrative and financial synergies along with organizational portfolio 
diversification. This result was confirmed by Jensen and Ruback [24], Bradley et al. [40], 
Campa and Kedia [48], and Matsusaka [49].  Therefore, while there appears to be 
agreement that industry related acquisitions will increase shareholder wealth in the long 
term, there is disagreement as to whether industry unrelated acquisitions can be beneficial 
or negative to shareholder wealth.  Whether this impacts on market perceptions and 
acquirer’s shareholder wealth at the time of the announcement needs further study.    
 
2.3.3 Deal size  
Empirical studies suggest that the deal size might affect the acquirer shareholders’ equity. 
Some of the findings suggest that a large acquisition destroys more value for the acquirer. 
Loderer and Martin [50] found that acquirers experience a greater loss when buying large 
targets because they tend to pay more to acquire the large target. Cole et al. [51] also noted 
that the cost of acquisition advice increases with the size of the deal, which can decrease 
the acquirer shareholder’s return. This result was also confirmed by Ingham et al. [52], who 
states that acquiring smaller targets is less costly and might increase the acquirer 
shareholders’ wealth. However, according to Firth [53], deal size implies the target’s scale, 
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so a large target might benefit the acquirer by increased reputation and social recognition 
and it might finally bring abnormal returns to the acquirer, suggesting that although there 
may be increased costs for the acquisition itself, the long term increase will outweigh the 
temporary one-off costs.  
Alexandridis et al. [54], however, testified that the target size and deal size are actually 
negatively associated with offer premium and that the overpayment potential in large deals 
appears to be low; in other words, the acquirer would earn an abnormal return from 
acquiring a less-costly large target.  However, Bednarczyk et al.’s [55] finding cannot be 
ignored which, in contrast to other studies, suggests that the size of the deal does not 
significantly impact on the return of the acquirer shareholder.  
Whether there is benefit or not from the size of the deal in the long term, if the market 
perceives there will be an effect, this could affect market value at the time of the acquisition 
announcement.  Further research is needed to determine whether the market views deal 
size as important and whether this affects acquirer shareholder wealth at the time of the 
acquisition announcement. 
 
2.4 Formulation of the Research Hypotheses 
In the light of the research objective and on the basis of the literature, the following 
hypotheses were formulated to investigate the short-term impact of domestic acquisitions 
on the acquirer shareholder’s equity in the US market: 
 
H1: There is a significant positive impact of domestic acquisition on the acquirer 
shareholder’s daily equity in the period around the acquisition announcement. 
HII: There is a significant positive impact of domestic acquisition on the acquirer 
shareholder’s equity in the short-term around the acquisition announcement. 
HIII: Methods of payment for an acquisition have a significant impact on the acquirer 
shareholders’ equity in the short-term around the acquisition announcement. 
HIV: Acquirer and target industry relatedness have significant impact on acquirer 
shareholder’s equity in a short term around acquisition announcement. 
HV:  Deal size has a significant impact on the acquirer shareholder’s equity in the short 
term around the acquisition announcement. 
 
 
3  Data and Method  
3.1 Event Study 
This research was undertaken using an event study approach. This has become a standard 
tool in finance research for evaluating stock price reactions to a specific event (McWilliams 
and Siegel [56]). An Event study is a statistical technique used to evaluate the impact of an 
event on the value of a firm. For example, the announcement of a domestic and cross border 
acquisition can be analyzed to see whether the investors believe that the acquisition will 
create or destroy value. In this study, event study methodology was applied to analyze the 
US acquirer shareholders’ equity around the announcement of a US domestic acquisition.  
Most empirical studies choose the announcement day as the event day because this is when 
the acquirer’s share price adjusts to incorporate the new information, assuming market 
efficiency of reflecting the probability of the success of the acquisition (Halpern [57]). 
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Hence, the event under investigation is the announcement of a US domestic acquisition and 
the event day, t0, is the day of the announcement.  
 
3.2 Sample and its Characteristics  
A sample of 90 US domestic acquisitions was randomly selected based on the US 
NASDAQ market during 2012-2014. The sample covered all sectors, including 
telecommunications, energy and power, healthcare, media and entertainment, real estate, 
consumer products and services, industries, transportation, retail except banks, insurance 
companies and other financial institutions. To ensure that the acquirer had 100% control of 
the target, only 100% takeover deals were included in the sample. The deal size varied from 
$1.6 million to $20.78 million.   
Among the sample of acquisitions, 41 consisted of transactions of less than $100 million 
and these were categorized as the ‘smaller size sub-sample’.  The remaining 49 acquisition 
deals of more than $100 million were categorized as the ‘larger size sub-sample’.  The 
payment modes also varied. Among the sample, 44 acquirers paid by cash and were 
categorized as the ‘cash only sub-sample’, and 46 acquirers paying by a combination of 
cash and stock were categorized as the ‘combination of cash and stock sub-sample’. 
According to industry relatedness, 73 acquirers were taking over targets in the same 
industry and were assigned to the ‘same industry sub-sample’; with the other 17 acquirers 
taking over targets in different industries and assigned to the ‘different industry sub-sample’ 
category.  
 
3.3 The Observation and Estimation Periods 
Since the assumption is that the market is efficient, the market should be sensitive to new 
information. The chosen observation period should not be too long, because if it is too long 
the return result will not accurately reflect the market’s reaction to the acquisition.  In 
order to test both the immediate and short-term response of the market pre-acquisition and 
post-acquisition, the present study chose four event windows (the observation periods): 10 
trading days before the acquisition announcement [-10, -1]; 1 trading day before and after 
the announcement [-1, 1]; 10 trading days after the announcement [1, 10]; and, 10 trading 
days before and after the acquisition announcement [-10, 10]. 
Concerning the estimation period, MacKinlay [58] once suggested that this should be at 
least 120 days prior to the deal announcement and should not overlap the observation period. 
Rani et al. [10] adopted an estimation window of 240 trading day pre-observation period. 
Shah and Deo [59] also applied an estimation window of 240 trading day pre-observation 
period to test the acquisition effect on the acquirer shareholder’s return.  In line with these 
two studies, the current study also defined the estimation period as the 240 trading days 
before the observation period: [-250, -11]. 
The Figure below illustrates both the estimation period and the observation period. 
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Figure 1: Event study timeline 
 
3.4 Estimation of Abnormal Returns 
The present study employed event study methodology in order to compute the average 
abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR). The Market 
model is considered the most commonly used model in event study methodology. It 
associates security return with return of market portfolio (MacKinlay [58]); it provides 
residuals with better statistical properties and is less costly than CAPM (Brown and Warner 
[60]). Therefore, in the current study the market model was considered to be the most 
appropriate model for the calculation of the expected return.  
 
)RE( - R = AR iitit                                                       (1) 
 
 ti,tm,iiti,  + R +  = )RE(                                                (2) 
 
Where: αi, βi:  Coefficient estimated by an ordinary least square regression of securities 
returns on the market return pre-observation periods. 
R m, t: Market index return (according to US NASDAQ CCMP index) 
 
𝑅𝑚𝑡 =
𝑀𝑖𝑡−𝑀𝑖𝑡−1
𝑀𝑖𝑡−1
                                                        (3) 
 
E (Ri,t): Expected return of firm i on event day t. 
R it: Actual return of security i on event day t. 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
                                                          (4) 
 
AR it: Abnormal return of security i on event day t. 
Average Abnormal Returns across N Firms were calculated using (Kothari and Warner [61]) 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1                                                       (5) 
 
And Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) and Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
(CAAR) for N Firms over the Observation Period from t1 to t2 (MacKinlay [58]) were 
calculated using 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡1𝑡2 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑡2
𝑖=𝑡1
                                                    (6) 
 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 =
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
                                                      (7) 
 
3.5 Statistical Testing 
Based on the assumption that the ARs/CARs are approximately normally distributed, a two-
tailed T-test was applied to identify whether AAR/CAAR significantly deviates from 0 on 
the null hypothesis that there is no average abnormal return for the acquirer during the event 
windows. The t-statistic for the average abnormal return for security i on day t was 
calculated as below (Serra [62]): 
 
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑆(𝐴𝑅𝑖)
                                                          (8) 
 
Where 
 
𝑆(𝐴𝑅𝑖) = √
1
(𝑇1−𝑇0+1)
∑ (𝐴𝑅𝑡 − 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ )2
𝑡=𝑇1
𝑡=𝑇0
                                     (9) 
 
(‘T1-T0+1’ is the length of the estimation period) 
For a sample of N firms on day t, the T- statistic for AAR was calculated following two 
steps:  
1st step:  the standardized average abnormal return was calculated:    
 
𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1                                                   (10) 
 
2nd step:  the T-statistic for AAR was:  
 
𝑇𝐴𝑅 = √𝑁 ∗ (𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡)                                                   (11) 
 
To test N firms over event window L, the T- statistic for CAAR was calculated following 
three steps:  
 
1st step: the standardized cumulative abnormal return (SCAR) was calculated: 
 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝐿 = ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝐿
𝑡=1                                                    (12) 
 
2nd step: the average SCAR was calculated: 
 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝐿 =
1
𝑁
∑
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝐿
√𝐿
𝑁
𝑖=1                                                   (13) 
 
3rd step: the T-statistic for CAAR was: 
 
𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅 = √𝑁𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝐿                                                      (14) 
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Finally, the t-test results for AAR and CAAR were then compared with the critical values 
at different significance levels, as shown below. According to Berenson et al. [63],  if the 
T-statistic falls outside of -1.64, 1.64, the hypothesis is rejected at a significance level of 
10%; if the T-statistic falls outside of (-1.96, 1.96), the hypothesis is rejected at a 
significance level of 5%; and if the T-statistic falls outside of (-2.58,2.58), the hypothesis 
is rejected at a significance level of 1%, which implies that it is impossible for the value to 
take place under a null hypothesis.  If the T-statistic falls inside the specific range of (-
1.64, 1.64), (-1.96, 1.96), (-2.58, 2.58), the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 
corresponding significance level. In addition, the t-statistic of the difference between the 
two sub-samples CAARs. (e.g. by cash only versus by combined cash and stock) for each 
selected event window was also calculated for the purpose of testing the statistical 
significance of the differential CAAR. If the differential CAAR is statistically different 
from 0, this suggests that the impact of one sub-sample is stronger than the other on the 
acquirer shareholder’s equity.   
 
 
4  Empirical Results 
Average abnormal returns on the announcement day and cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAARs) for various event windows were analyzed for domestic acquisitions. In 
addition, the cumulative abnormal returns were compared for sub-samples segregated on 
the basis of method of payment (cash only / cash and stock), deal size (small and large) and 
industry relatedness (same industry and different industry). 
 
4.1 Panel A: Acquirer’s Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) Around the 
Acquisition Announcement Day (t0).  
Daily average abnormal returns were calculated for the full sample of domestic acquisitions. 
A T-test was performed to see the significant means differences. All of the abnormal returns 
were expressed in percentages. The results of the T-test are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Average abnormal return for acquirer shareholder’s equity around the acquisition 
announcement day 
Event days relative to the announcement day AAR T-Statistic 
-10 0.03% -0.34 
-9 -0.20% -1.50 
-8 -0.08% -1.02 
-7 -0.78%** -2.33 
-6 0.07% -0.50 
-5 0.65% 0.72 
-4 -0.53% -0.99 
-3 0.89%* 1.92 
-2 0.99%*** 4.36 
-1 1.45%*** 8.51 
0 0.54%*** 3.91 
1 -0.07% -1.16 
2 -0.58% -0.13 
3 -0.04% 0.04 
4 0.15% 0.66 
5 0.09% 1.07 
6 -0.04% -0.88 
7 -0.03% -1.01 
8 -0.23% -1.54 
9 -0.23% -0.58 
10 0.04% 0.06 
*, **, *** represents the significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
 
Considering the long period of acquisition negotiation and the many staff in different 
functional departments, there is a possibility that acquisition information leakage to the 
market might occur (Datta et al. [9]). Based on this assumption, as is shown in the table 
above, the market seems not so interested in the domestic acquisition longer pre acquisition, 
e.g. on event days -9, -8, and -7 which have successive negative AARs of  -0.2%, -0.08%, 
and -0.78% respectively. In particular, on event day -7, AAR is -0.78% with a significance 
level of 5% (t= -.2.33). As time passes and it becomes closer to the acquisition 
announcement day, the market becomes more expectant and optimistic about the impact of 
the acquisition, which is testified by the successive positive AARs of 0.07%, 0.65%, 0.89%, 
and 1.45% at event days (-6), (-5), (-3), (-2), (-1).  In particular, on event days (-2), (-1) 
the AARs are both significantly positive at the 1% level.  When it comes to the acquisition 
announcement day, the AAR is slightly reduced but it remains positive; AAR is 0.54% at a 
significance level of 1% (t=3.91). However, after the acquisition announcement, the market 
becomes sober and the passion cools, which can be inferred from the AARs of -0.07%,-
0.58%, -0.04%, -0.04%,-0.03%, -0.23%, -0.23% on event days (1), (2), (3), (6), (7), (8), (9) 
respectively. This phenomenon is in accordance with Uddin and Boateng’s [64] findings 
that positive returns for acquirers tend to be reached quite near the pre-announcement day 
Impact of Domestic Acquisition on Acquirer Shareholders’ Equity on the US Market    43 
but the market has to re-adjust after the acquisition, which makes the return slightly less 
post-acquisition. On the basis of the results of the study, the first hypothesis (HI) was 
supported, i.e. that there is a significant positive impact of a domestic acquisition on the 
acquirer shareholder’s daily equity during the period around the acquisition announcement. 
The findings of this study are consistent with the studies of Arnold [1], Bradley et al. [18], 
and Dennis and McConnnel [19]. 
 
4.2 Panel B: Acquirer’s Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) 
Around the Acquisition Announcement Day (t0)  
Cumulative average abnormal returns were calculated for the full sample of US domestic 
acquisitions for four event intervals (-10, -1), (-1, 1), (1, 10), (-10, 10) respectively for 
evaluation pre-announcement, in-announcement, post-announcement, and in the short term 
around the announcement. The significance of the findings was evaluated based on a t–test.  
All of the cumulative abnormal returns are expressed in percentages. 
 
Table 2: Acquirer’s cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) around the acquisition 
announcement day (t0) 
Event Windows CAAR T-statistic 
(-10,-1) 2.47%*** 2.79 
(-1,1) 1.92%*** 6.51 
(1,10) -0.95% -1.10 
(-10,10) 2.06%** 2.02 
*, **, *** represents the significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
 
Table 2 also implies that, for pre-domestic acquisition, the market generally holds an 
optimistic and expectant attitude about the deal.  This is based on the previous assumption 
that the market might receive some leaked information about the acquisition deal close to 
the announcement date, which can be testified by the CAAR for event window (-10, -1) 
which was 2.47% at a significant level of 1% (t=2.79). When it comes to the announcement 
day, the market remains confident and has positive expectations about the domestic 
acquisition, which is also proved by the CAAR of 1.92% at a significance level of 1% 
(t=6.51) in event window (-1, 1). However, post-domestic acquisition, the market again 
becomes sober, cools and readjusts itself, which results in the acquirer return becoming 
slightly less than those just recorded previously. The event window (1, 10) insignificant 
CAAR of -0.95% might explain this. In general, in the short term around a domestic 
acquisition announcement, the market remains positively expectant and sober about the 
acquisition, which causes the acquirer shareholders to gain in the takeovers, which can be 
testified by the significant CAAR of 2.06% in the event window (-10, 10) at a significance 
level of 5% (t=2.02). This finding from the study supports the second hypothesis (HII), i.e. 
that there is a significant positive impact of domestic acquisitions on the acquirer 
shareholder’s equity in the short-term around an acquisition announcement. 
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4.3 Panel C: Acquirer Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns by Method of 
Payment  
According to different payment modes in domestic acquisitions, the samples were 
categorized into two sub-samples. One sample consisted of the 44 acquirers paying by cash 
only; the other consisted of the 46 acquirers paying by a combination of cash and stock. 
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) were calculated for each sub-sample for 
four event windows (-10, -1), (-1, 1), (1, 10), (-10, 10) respectively for evaluation pre-
announcement, in-announcement, post-announcement, and in the short-term around the 
announcement. T-statistics were calculated for each sub-sample CAAR in each window 
respectively together with their mean difference CAAR in each event window as well for 
assessment of the statistical significance of the results. 
 
Table 3: CAARs by cash only versus by cash and stock 
Event Window Cash Only CAAR                                           
(T-statistic) (N=44) 
Cash and Stock CAAR                              
(T-statistic)(N=46) 
Difference CAAR                             
(T-statistic) 
(-10,-1) 1.11% 3.77%*** 2.66% 
(0.85) (3.07) (1.14) 
(-1,1) 2.57%*** 1.28%*** -1.29% 
(4.62) (4.58) (-0.90) 
(1,10) -0.86% -1.04% -0.17% 
(-0.80) (-0.75) (-0.10) 
(-10,10) 1.25% 2.83%** 1.57% 
(0.76) (2.08) (0.54) 
*, **, *** represents the significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
 
In this sample, there was a fairly equal split between the acquirer managers’ choice of 
payment by cash and choice of payment by a combination of cash and stock. From the table 
above, statistically, in the pre-announcement period, the shareholders of an acquirer paying 
by a combination of cash and stock tend to gain more wealth than the shareholders of an 
acquirer paying by cash only. This was testified by a significant cash and stock CAAR of 
3.77% (t=3.07) at a significance level of 1% in event window (-10, -1), although the mean 
difference in the CAAR of 2.66% was statistically insignificant.  However, it is interesting 
to note that around the announcement day, the situation appears to reverse with the 
shareholders of the acquirer paying by cash only having higher gains than the shareholders 
of the acquirer paying by a combination of cash and stock.  This can be seen from the 
significant cash only CAAR of 2.57% (t=4.62) compared with the cash and stock CAAR 
of 1.28% (t=4.58), both at a significance level of 1% in event window (-1, 1). In the post-
announcement period, the shareholders of an acquirer paying by cash seems to have a 
smaller decrease in wealth than the shareholders of an acquirer paying by a combination of 
cash and stock, however, these findings are not significant with a mean difference CAAR 
of 0.17%.  
In general, across the entire short acquisition announcement period, the shareholders of an 
acquirer that pays with a combination of cash and stock have a greater increase in wealth 
than the shareholders of an acquirer paying by cash only.  However, these findings are 
insignificant, with a mean difference CAAR of 1.57% in event window (-10,10). Overall, 
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therefore, as the mean difference in the CAARs for all event windows was not statistically 
significant, these results do not support the third hypothesis (HIII), i.e. the method of 
payment does not have a significant impact on the acquirer shareholder’s equity in the short 
term around an acquisition announcement. This can be explained because, according to 
previous findings and experiences, both methods of payment have their own distinctive 
advantages and disadvantages. Paying by cash reduces the agency cost caused by requesting 
Security Exchange Commission for the stock settlement, but causes a higher premium from 
the target companies due to the immediate tax liability imposed on the targets. Paying by 
cash and stock can be more secure for a successful acquisition especially in a risky 
environment but it conveys a negative signal to the market that the acquirer might not 
conduct an accurate valuation of the acquisitions.  This would also explain why there was 
no clear preference by acquirer managers as to which payment method was used. 
 
4.4 Panel D: Acquirer Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns by Industry 
Relatedness 
According to the industry relatedness of the acquirer and the target, the sample was 
categorized into two sub-groups. One group consisted of 73 acquirers taking over targets 
in the same industry; and the other group consisted of 17 acquirers taking over targets in 
different industries. Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) were calculated for 
each sub-sample for four event windows (-10, -1), (-1, 1), (1, 10), (-10, 10) respectively for 
evaluation pre-announcement, in-announcement, post-announcement, and in the short term 
around the announcement. T-statistics were also calculated for each sub-sample CAAR in 
each window. 
 
Table 4: Acquirer cumulative average abnormal returns by industry relatedness 
Event Window Same Industry 
CAAR                                           
(T-statistic) (N=73) 
Different Industry 
CAAR                           
(T-statistic) (N=17) 
Difference CAAR                             
(T-statistic)
(-10,-1) 2.90% *** 0.64% 2.26% 
3.35 -0.51 -1.41 
(-1,1) 2.36%*** 0.04% 2.32% 
7.52 -0.61 -1.44 
(1,10) -1.88% 3.03% -4.91% 
-1.48 0.54 1.37 
(-10,10) 1.70%** 3.61% -1.91% 
2.27 -0.05 0.42 
*, **, *** represents the significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
 
According to the sub-sample data above regarding 73 acquisitions in same industry and 17 
acquisitions in different industries, there appears to be a clear preference for acquirer 
managers to take over targets in the same industry, which can bring the acquirers more 
operation synergy, rather than taking over targets in different industries, where the focus is 
on financial synergy through organizational portfolio diversification.  
Statistically, as shown in table 4, in the pre-announcement period, the shareholders of an 
acquirer taking over targets in the same industry do gain more than the shareholders of 
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businesses which acquire target in different industries.  This is shown by the 2.9% same 
industry CAAR at a significance level of 1% (t=3.35) in event window (-10, -1), compared 
with the different industry CAAR of 0.64%. There are then further gains to be made for the 
same group around the announcement day, as shown in the event window (-1, 1), where the 
acquirer taking over same industry targets gained a statistically significant 2.36% (t=7.52) 
CAAR, which was more than the acquirer taking over different industry targets, with a 
CAAR of only 0.04%.  
However, in the post-announcement period, the situation was reversed. As shown in event 
window (1, 10), businesses taking over targets in different industries had shareholder 
wealth increases with a mean difference CAAR of 4.91% more than acquirer taking over 
same industry targets. Indeed, observing the whole short acquisition announcement period 
as a whole, event window (-10,10), businesses taking over targets in different industries 
increased shareholder wealth by a mean difference CAAR of 1.91% more than acquirer 
taking over same industry targets.  This might suggest that, overall, the market expects 
operational synergy in terms of corporate control efficiency and economy of scale through 
acquiring same industry targets but that these may take a longer time, whereas the benefits 
of financial synergy through organizational portfolio diversification by acquiring different 
industry targets are expected to be experienced earlier and are, therefore, reflected more 
quickly in the market share price. However, across the period as a whole, the mean 
difference between the CAARs was not statistically significant and therefor, the fourth 
hypothesis (HIV) was not supported, i.e. that there is no significant impact on overall 
shareholder wealth in the short term around an acquisition announcement as to whether the 
acquisition. 
 
4.5 Panel E: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns by Deal Size 
Finally, the sample was categorized into two sub-samples according to the deal size of the 
domestic acquisitions. One sub-group consisted of 41 acquisitions for which the deal size 
was smaller than $100million; and the other sub-group consisted of 49 acquisitions for 
which the deals were larger than $100 million. Cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs) were calculated for each sub-sample for four event windows (-10,-1), (-1, 1), (1, 
10), (-10, 10) respectively for evaluation pre-announcement, in-announcement, post-
announcement, and in the short period around the announcement. T-statistics were also 
calculated for each sub-sample CAAR in each window respectively as well as their mean 
difference CAAR in each event window. 
 
Table 5: Cumulative average abnormal returns by deal size 
Event Window Smaller Size CAAR                                           
(T-statistic) (N=41)  
Larger Size CAAR                                  
(T-statistic)(N=49)                
Difference CAAR                             
(T-statistic) 
(-10,-1) 1.90% 2.95%*** 1.04% 
0.32 3.49 0.43 
(-1,1) 1.47%*** 2.29%*** 0.83% 
3.58 5.54 0.56 
(1,10) -2.14%* 0.04% 2.18% 
-1.74 0.10 1.12 
(-10,10) -0.25% 3.99%*** 4.24% 
-0.64 3.33 1.39 
*, **, *** represents the significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
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As shown in table 5 above, larger size acquisitions overwhelmingly outperformed smaller 
size acquisitions for increasing acquirer shareholders’ equity in all event windows. In the 
pre-announcement period of (-10,-1), the larger acquisitions’ CAAR is 2.95% at a 
significance level of 1% (t=3.49), which is 1.04% more than the CAAR for the smaller 
acquisitions. During the acquisition announcement period of (-1, 1), the larger transaction 
acquisitions had a CAAR of 2.29% at a significance level of 1% (t=5.54), which is 0.83% 
more than the smaller transaction CAAR. In the post-announcement period of (1, 10), again 
the CAAR for the larger acquisitions was more than that of the smaller acquisitions (2.18% 
more). Taking the whole short announcement period into consideration, according to the 
event window (-10, 10), the total CAAR over the whole period is 3.99% at a significance 
level of 1% (t=3.33) for the larger acquisitions, which is 4.24% more than the CAAR for 
the smaller sized acquisitions.  This finding is in line with Firth’s [53] findings that taking 
over large targets tends to bring a high reputation and social recognition for acquirers, 
which is immediately reflected in the market share price. However, despite all periods 
showing more favorable results for the larger acquisitions, none of the differences in the 
CAARs for any of the event windows was statistically significant, and therefore, hypothesis 
V was not supported, i.e. statistically the deal size does not have significant impact on the 
acquirer shareholder’s equity in the short period around an acquisition announcement. 
 
 
5  Conclusion 
This event study has shown some interesting results for the sample of 90 US domestic 
acquisition deals undertaken between 2012 and 2014.  As expected, it was found that, 
generally, the acquirer shareholders’ equity significantly increased in the short term around 
a domestic acquisition announcement. This was shown by: statistically large positive 
returns for acquirers quite near the pre-acquisition announcement caused by the market’s 
passion for the synergy effect, followed by a slightly negative return caused by the market’s 
self-readjustment post announcement. When taking into consideration the three factors 
(payment mode / industry relatedness / deal size), due to the fact that the mean difference 
in the CAARs for these in all of the event windows was not statistically significant, this 
suggests that payment mode, industry relatedness, and deal size have no significant impact 
on the acquirer shareholders’ wealth over the period as a whole, causing us to reject the 
hypotheses that these factors might have a statistically significant impact on shareholder 
wealth over the announcement period.   
Although sufficient data from Bloomberg was obtained for the analysis undertaken and 
discussed in this article, the research was limited by the data that was available.  Originally 
there were plans to also study the impact of acquiring listed versus unlisted firms, but due 
to the insufficient data for unlisted firms in Bloomberg, the analysis for this factor was 
omitted.  Another factor which would have been useful to investigate was the impact of 
whether an acquisition was ‘friendly’ or ‘hostile’.  Again, however, this was not possible 
due to insufficient documents and information explicitly showing the deal attitude. Also 
omitted from the present research were acquisitions by multiple acquirers’ which were 
excluded for simplicity of analysis, given the complex of distribution of returns among 
multiple acquirers. Given the lack of statistical significance for the three factors of payment 
method, industry relatedness and deal size, the intended regression analysis to analyze the 
percentage/proportion that each factor might contribute to the acquirer’s return became 
unnecessary. Further research could be conducted to include the above three factors that 
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are not discussed in this study (targeting unlisted firms / acquisition attitude / multiple 
acquirers) by accessing more sources and, , if appropriate, regression analysis could be 
applied as well to conclude the proportion/percentage that each factor might contribute to 
the acquirer’s shareholder return. 
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